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                              OPINION 
                                            
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Merritt G. Stansfield appeals from a judgment rendered after 
a jury trial convicting him of three counts of mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, two counts of engaging in unlawful 
monetary transactions (money laundering) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1957, one count of tampering with a witness in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), and one count of criminal forfeiture 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982.  He was sentenced to, inter alia, 
incarceration for a term of 306 months. 
     Stansfield contends that his conviction on two of the three 
mail fraud counts, the two money laundering counts, and the 
criminal forfeiture count must be reversed and remanded for a new 
trial by reason of irregularities occurring during jury 
deliberations.  He also argues that the conviction on witness 
tampering must be vacated and remanded with instructions to enter 
a judgment of acquittal on that count due to insufficient evidence.  
Alternatively, he argues that the judgment of conviction on that 
count must be reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground 
that the jury was not properly instructed.  Finally, he contends 
the district court erred in several respects in applying the 
federal sentencing guidelines. 
     We will affirm the judgment of conviction on all counts except 
the witness tampering count.  As to that count, we will reverse and 
remand for a new trial.  In light of this disposition, we need not 
reach Stansfield's argument that his sentence was contrary to the 
guidelines. 
                                I. 
                                A. 
     We take the facts with regard to the counts upon which 
Stansfield was convicted in the light most favorable to the 
government, the verdict winner.  In 1990 Stansfield's home was 
destroyed by fire.  Erie Insurance Company agreed to reimburse 
Stansfield for the replacement cost of the insured items, as well 
as the cost from the loss of the use of his house.  In May of 1992, 
Stansfield sent Erie a list of insured items he claimed were lost 
in the fire.  Some of these were later found intact at other 
locations.  By reason of the loss, Erie sent Stansfield checks 
totalling approximately $225,000.  Stansfield used some of these 
funds to purchase a boat and trailer. 
     Erie and state law enforcement officials began an 
investigation of the fire in 1992.  Although they determined that 
arson caused the fire, Stansfield was never conclusively found to 
be the arsonist.  Investigators from Erie and Pennsylvania State 
Police spoke with Dwight Hoffman, a friend of Stansfield's, several 
times in 1992 and early 1993.  Hoffman was quite knowledgeable 
about Stansfield's home and its contents; he had stored many of 
Stansfield's personal effects in his home prior to the fire. 
     Hoffman's wife Dee was also a friend of Stansfield's.  When 
Hoffman and Dee ended their relationship in August of 1992, 
Stansfield and Dee became romantically involved.  Some evidence 
suggests that Dee Hoffman was complicit in Stansfield's scheme. 
     State troopers also communicated with Jack Love, whom 
Stansfield had solicited to burn his home.  Stansfield threatened 
to kill Love if he told anyone of the solicitation.  Love informed 
Stansfield in May of 1993 that law enforcement officials had 
contacted him about the fire. 
     That September, Erie referred the matter to federal postal 
inspectors.  The Postal Inspector presented the case to the United 
States Attorney's Office, which requested that the Postal 
Inspection Service continue the investigation. 
     The witness tampering charge stems from an incident that 
occurred on October 7, 1993.  On that date Stansfield entered 
Dwight Hoffman's home uninvited.  Hoffman's parents, Eugene and 
Joyce, were present but Dwight Hoffman was not.  When asked what he 
was doing there, Stansfield replied that he was "sick and tired of 
[Dwight] running down [Stansfield's] name and ruining [his] 
business."  App. at 43.  Stansfield struck the Hoffmans, knocking 
them to the ground.  He repeatedly kicked Eugene Hoffman in the 
head and body.  When Eugene Hoffman attempted to get up, Stansfield 
knocked him down again, kicking him in the head until Hoffman was 
partially unconscious.  Stansfield took both the Hoffmans to the 
basement, where he bound their hands and feet.  When Eugene Hoffman 
tried to free himself, Stansfield kicked him in the head several 
more times. 
     Stansfield then went upstairs, returning shortly with a 
shotgun and shells.  He donned latex gloves, tinted "shooting" 
glasses, and ear protectors that are worn on shooting ranges.  He 
loaded the gun and waited for Dwight Hoffman to arrive.  When 
Dwight Hoffman appeared, Stansfield took him to the basement, hit 
him with the butt of the shotgun, and ordered him to sit next to 
his parents.  Stansfield then placed the shotgun on the throat of 
Dwight Hoffman and stated, "I'm going to ask you some questions, 
and I want the truth, because the gun is loaded, the safety is off, 
and my finger is on the trigger, is that clear?"  App. at 78. 
     Stansfield first inquired why Dwight Hoffman had "sen[t] the 
cops after [him] about [his] house," or why Dwight had "called the 
police about his fire."  App. at 54, 79.  At some point Dwight 
Hoffman lunged for the gun.  It went off, firing a shot between 
Dwight Hoffman's neck and Joyce Hoffman's head.  A struggle ensued.  
Eventually Dwight and Eugene Hoffman were able to subdue Stansfield 
until a police officer arrived. 
                                B. 
     Stansfield was indicted on a twelve count indictment.  Counts 
I through IV charged mail fraud.  Count V charged using fire to 
commit mail fraud.  Counts VI through X charged money laundering.  
Count XI, stemming from the incident on October 7, 1993, charged 
tampering with a witness.  Count XII was criminal forfeiture 
predicated on the money laundering counts. 
     The instructions given to the jury on Count XI are one focus 
of this appeal, and so we recite them at length: 
                    The grand jury charged, with respect to count 
                    11, that on or about October 7, 1993, in the 
                    Middle District of Pennsylvania, the 
                    defendant, Merritt G. Stansfield, Jr., did 
                    assault and attempt to kill one Dwight E. 
                    Hoffman with the intent to prevent Hoffman's 
                    communication of information relating to 
                    Stansfield's commission of federal offenses . 
                    . . to a law enforcement officer, this being 
                    in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
                    Section 1512(a)(1)(C). 
                         The relevant statute on this subject is 
                    Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512, 
                    and provides as follows:  Whoever knowingly 
                    uses intimidation or physical force, with 
                    intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the 
                    communication to a law enforcement officer of 
                    information relating to the commission or 
                    possible commission of a federal offense shall 
                    be guilty of a crime. 
                         The statute is designed to protect 
                    persons who may be called to testify or give 
                    evidence in a federal proceeding, either civil 
                    or criminal, and persons who have information 
                    about federal crimes.  The integrity of the 
                    federal system of justice depends upon the 
                    cooperation of such potential witnesses.  If 
                    persons with information do not come forward, 
                    produce evidence and appear when summoned, the 
                    criminal justice system will be significantly 
                    impaired.  This statute was devised to make it 
                    unlawful for anyone to tamper with such a 
                    witness in the manner described by the 
                    statute. 
                         In order to prove the defendant guilty of 
                    the charge in the indictment, the government 
                    must prove each of the following elements 
                    beyond a reasonable doubt:  First, that on or 
                    about the date charged, the defendant used 
                    intimidation, physical force, or threats, or 
                    attempted to do so; and second, that the 
                    defendant acted knowingly and with intent to 
                    prevent the communication to a law enforcement 
                    officer of information relating to the 
                    commission or possible commission of a federal 
                    offense. 
                     
          App. at 103-05.  The district court then elaborated on both of 
these elements and added:  "The law does not require that a federal 
proceeding be pending at the time or even that it was about to be 
initiated when the intimidation, physical force or threats were 
made."  App. at 106.  Stansfield took no objection to these 
portions of the jury charge. 
     The jury returned a partial verdict convicting Stansfield on 
Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, and XI.  As the jury was polled, juror 
number two was excused from the jury box because she was not 
feeling well.  She eventually returned and, in the presence of the 
other jurors, indicated her concurrence in the guilty verdicts.  
During a subsequent recess, jurors number one, two, and nine 
communicated to the deputy clerk that they wished to speak with the 
court.  They did not indicate the reasons for wanting to do so.  
After consulting with counsel, the court declined to hear from the 
jurors at that time. 
     The jury was brought into the courtroom and directed to 
deliberate on Count XII, which had not previously been submitted to 
it.  A mistrial was subsequently declared as to Counts IV, V, VIII, 
IX, and X.  The government later dismissed those counts subject to 
reinstatement should any portion of the conviction be vacated.  
Immediately after the jury returned to the jury room to commence 
deliberations on Count XII, jurors number one, four, and nine 
abruptly left the jury room and refused to return.  The three 
apparently were crying and were "emotionally distraught."  App. at 
143.  They stated that "they had reasons for [initially] voting the 
way they did" and had been told they were "stupid."  App. at 143.  
At this point, Stansfield waived his right to a jury trial with 
regard to Count XII and the jury was discharged.  The district 
court found Stansfield guilty on Count XII. 
     The district court thereafter met with the three jurors, first 
as a group and later individually.  All three were women who had 
previously asked to speak with the district court.  All three 
stated they had been pressured into concurring with the guilty 
verdicts by the jury foreman who, along with other jurors, had 
used gender-based insults to intimidate them.  The jurors stated as 
an example that they were called "stupid female[s]" and were told 
that they "didn't have minds" because they are women.  App. at 169, 
156.  One of the jurors stated that a fourth juror, who had not 
felt well during the jury poll, also had been affected by these 
gender-based insults.  All three indicated that, but for the 
pressure that the other jurors exerted on them, they would have 
voted for acquittal on Counts II, VI, and VII.  Juror number one 
related that she also would have voted for acquittal on Count I. 
     Stansfield moved to vacate the convictions on those four 
counts.  The court denied the motion.  The district court sentenced 
Stansfield to, inter alia, 306 months incarceration.  The sentence 
was to run concurrently with a 7 1/2 to 15 year sentence imposed in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, stemming 
from the October 7, 1993, incident.  This appeal followed. 
                               II. 
                                A. 
     Stansfield contends that, based on the in camera questioning 
of jurors number one, four, and nine, the verdict as to Counts I, 
II, VI, and VII was not unanimous and the matter should be remanded 
for a new trial on these counts.  Moreover, he contends that 
because the forfeiture count on which he was convicted, Count XII, 
was predicated on the guilty verdict on Counts VI and VII, that 
count should also be reversed and remanded.  We hold that, pursuant 
to Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), consideration of the testimony of those 
jurors is not permitted.  The judgment of conviction on those 
counts will be affirmed. 
     It is a common-law rule of ancient vintage that a jury's 
verdict may not be impeached by the testimony of a juror concerning 
any influences on the jury's deliberations that emanated from 
within the jury room.  See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 
117, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2745-46 (1987); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 
264, 268, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784 (1915); Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 n.19 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1119 (1976).  That precept has been codified in 
the federal system as Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), which provides, in 
relevant part: 
                    Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict 
                    or indictment, a juror may not testify as to 
                    any matter or statement occurring during the 
                    course of the jury's deliberations or to the 
                    effect of anything upon that or any other 
                    juror's mind or emotions as influencing the 
                    juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict 
                    or indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
                    processes in connection therewith, except that 
                    a juror may testify on the question whether 
                    extraneous prejudicial information was 
                    improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
                    whether any outside influence was improperly 
                    brought to bear upon any juror. 
                     
          See also Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121, 107 S.Ct. at 2748; Gereau, 523 
F.2d at 149 n.22.  Testimony concerning "intimidation or harassment 
of one juror by another" falls squarely within the core prohibition 
of the Rule.  Id. at 150. 
     Recognizing the considerable obstacle this provision places in 
his path, Stansfield attempts to clear the hurdle in two ways.  
First, he contends that Rule 606(b) is implicated only after a jury 
has been discharged.  Because the district court was aware of an 
irregularity before it discharged the jury, the argument goes, it 
should have waited to discharge them until it had spoken to the 
three jurors.  Second, he argues, although Rule 606(b) bars members 
of a jury from impeaching is own verdict, it does not bar the use 
of jurors' testimony to impeach an allegedly defective jury poll.  
We address these contentions in turn. 
                                1. 
     There is some support for Stansfield's argument that timing is 
relevant in considering the implications of Rule 606(b).  In 
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127, 107 S.Ct. at 2751, the Supreme Court 
stated, in dicta, that jurors "may report inappropriate juror 
behavior to the court before they render a verdict."  In Government 
of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1078 (3d Cir. 1985), 
we wrote that "questions concerning the competency of a jury 
ordinarily are not entertained once the jury has rendered its 
verdict" (emphasis added).  And in Gereau, 523 F.2d at 148, we 
stated that "a juror may not impeach [her] own verdict once the 
jury has been discharged" (emphasis added). 
     Recognizing that the testimony of the three jurors here was 
proffered after the verdict was read into the record, after the 
jury was polled and indicated its unanimous consent, and after the 
jury was discharged, Stansfield first contends that the district 
court judge had a duty to meet with the three jurors as soon as 
they first requested to speak with him.  This request occurred 
after the partial verdict was rendered and the jury was polled, but 
before it commenced deliberations on Count XII.   Essentially, the 
contention is that the district court abused its discretion in not 
conferring with the three jurors when they first requested to speak 
with him. 
     It is apparent from the record, however, that at the time of 
the first request, the district court had no indication of the 
reason for the requested meeting.  Moreover, even if the district 
court had an idea of the reasons for the requested conference, it 
enjoys considerable discretion in determining how to deal with 
allegations of juror misconduct.  See United States v. Resko, 3 
F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993); Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1987).  We cannot conclude that 
the district court abused its discretion in declining to meet with 
the three jurors when they first requested a meeting. 
     Stansfield further contends that, at the very least, the 
district court should have made inquiry immediately after the three 
jurors bolted from the jury room, instead of first discharging the 
jury.  This contention would have merit only if there were a 
relevant distinction between receiving juror testimony to impeach 
a verdict before the jury is discharged and doing so after it is 
discharged.  If such a distinction is not relevant then the 
district court could not have abused its discretion in first 
discharging the jury and then questioning the three jurors.  
Stansfield's argument is essentially that Rule 606(b) comes into 
play only when the jury has been discharged and not at some earlier 
point in the proceedings, such as when the verdict is rendered or 
the jury polled. 
     This contention was squarely addressed and rejected by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 758-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
821, 99 S.Ct. 85 (1978).  In Hockridge, as in this case, a partial 
verdict was rendered in a criminal case and the jury sent back for 
further deliberations on the remainder of the verdict.  See id. at 
756-57.  During those deliberations, two jurors spoke with the 
district court in camera and expressed reservations about their 
concurrence in the partial verdicts.  See id. at 757.  On appeal 
the defendants argued that Rule 606(b) is inapplicable where a 
partial verdict has been rendered but the jury has not yet been 
discharged.  See id. at 758. 
     The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this 
argument.  It reasoned that applying Rule 606(b) even before the 
jury has been discharged furthers two important objectives:  
verdict finality and enhancing the jury's freedom of deliberation.  
See id. at 759.  As for the first objective, the court recognized 
that while "finality is not sought for its own sake," allowing a 
partial verdict to be impeached while deliberations ensue on the 
remainder of the verdict would essentially eviscerate the benefits 
sought to be achieved by allowing partial verdicts in the first 
place.  Id.  As for freedom of jury deliberations, the court noted 
that "the legislative history of Rule 606(b), while perhaps not 
determinative, reveals the strong congressional purpose of 
protecting the jury deliberation process," and concluded that "the 
policy against intrusion into internal deliberations remains the 
same," irrespective of whether a partial verdict or a complete 
verdict is at issue.  Id.  Thus, the court concluded, "where a 
partial verdict has been recorded, we perceive no reasons of 
sufficient magnitude to depart from the normal rule governing 
impeachment of jury verdicts."  Id.  We agree. 
     In Gereau, 523 F.2d at 148, we identified several objectives 
that Rule 606(b) was designed to foster:  "(1) discouraging 
harassment of jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict 
set aside; (2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors; 
(3) reducing incentives for jury tampering; (4) promoting verdict 
finality; [and] (5) maintaining the viability of the jury as a 
judicial decision-making body."  Of these goals, the first and 
third would be unaffected by erecting the Rule 606(b) barrier at 
some point prior to discharge of the jury. 
     As explained at length by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Hockridge, 573 F.2d at 759-60, employing the 
prohibitions of Rule 606(b) even before the jury is discharged 
serves to foster both the openness of jury deliberations and 
verdict finality.  It also serves to further the fifth goal we 
identified in Gereau, which is intrinsically related to the goals 
of free deliberation and finality:  that of maintaining the jury's 
integrity as an independent decision-making body within the 
judicial branch of government.  Thus, while only some of the 
objectives of Rule 606(b) are fostered by applying that Rule before 
jury discharge, we conclude that these considerations are 
sufficient to make that Rule fully applicable at that point in 
time. 
     Finally, Stansfield cites United States v. Marinari, 32 F.3d 
1209, 1214 (7th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that "[u]ntil the 
jury is actually discharged by separating or dispersing (not merely 
being declared discharged), the verdict remains subject to review" 
and thus "finality of the verdict comes upon the separation and 
dispersal of the jurors."  Stansfield misconstrues the case.  In 
Marinari, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was 
addressing finality as it relates to "record[ation]" of a verdict 
within the meaning of Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d), not as it relates to 
the triggering of the prohibition of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).  Marinaridid 
not involve an application of Rule 606(b), nor did the court 
have any reason to discuss the implications of that Rule.  Although 
the court held that a jury could be recalled before actual 
dispersal for purposes of conducting a jury poll, it never 
suggested that individual members of the jury were ever competent 
to impeach the jury verdict.  Marinari is useful only to the extent 
that it recognizes that formal discharge is not as crucial as 
actual dispersal.  One cannot infer from the court's language that 
Rule 606(b) is implicated only upon discharge, dispersal, or 
separation of the jury, as opposed to some earlier point in the 
proceedings. 
     In fact, Marinari supports our conclusion.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that recordation of the 
verdict takes place upon actual dispersal or separation of the jury 
only when the jury has not been polled.  See id. at 1213.  On the 
other hand, "[w]here a poll is taken, the verdict becomes final and 
`recorded,' when the twelfth juror's assent to that verdict is made 
on the record."  Id.  Here, the jury was polled and, according to 
Marinari, the partial verdict became final when juror number twelve 
concurred with the verdict on the record. 
     Moreover, the reasons the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit gave for establishing actual separation or dispersal as the 
"point of no return" for purposes of conducting a jury poll are 
inapposite to the issue of where that point is located for purposes 
of inquiry into internal influences on the jurors.  The court 
reasoned that, before dispersal of the jury, individual jurors 
continue to be isolated from contact with the outside world and, 
therefore, their answers to a jury poll would not be tainted by 
external influences until dispersal.  See id. at 1214.  As noted 
above, while several of the policies underlying the prohibition 
embodied in Rule 606(b) assume that there will have been contact 
with the outside world, and therefore those policies are not 
implicated if the Rule were to apply before discharge, the other 
rationales behind Rule 606(b) apply with full force even before the 
jury is discharged.  Marinari is fully consistent with our ruling. 
     We need not address definitively the point at which Fed. R. 
Evid. 606(b) comes into play.  We hold only that its prohibition on 
using juror testimony to impeach the jury's verdict applies at some 
point prior to the discharge of the jury.  Had the district court 
here questioned the three jurors prior to the jury's discharge, the 
jurors still would have been incompetent by virtue of Rule 606(b) 
to impeach the jury's verdict.  Stansfield's contention that the 
district court abused its discretion by questioning the jurors only 
after it discharged the jury is without merit. 
                                2. 
     Stansfield also seeks to avoid the Rule 606(b) hurdle by 
characterizing the juror's testimony as tending to impeach the 
integrity of the jury poll rather than the verdict itself.  
Stansfield does not contend that any irregularity occurred during 
the polling process itself that would have alerted the court to the 
true nature of the problem.  Although juror number two excused 
herself because she was not feeling well, it did not become 
apparent until much later that this juror's health may have been 
affected by something that occurred in the jury room.  Moreover, 
the three jurors who eventually spoke with the court in camerarequested to 
do so only after the polling process was completed. 
     Stansfield's argument at bottom is the contention that the 
jury poll can be attacked by subsequent juror recantation even 
though the verdict itself cannot.  This distinction is unavailing.  
The jury poll is not a distinct entity that exists separate and 
apart from the verdict.  Rather, the jury poll is a mere reflection 
of the verdict.  To attempt to impeach the poll by reference to 
intimidation that the jurors claim they felt during deliberations, 
or that they feared they would again feel when they resumed their 
deliberations, is no different than attacking the verdict directly.  
Rule 606(b) forbids this. 
     Moreover, adopting Stansfield's position would mean that no 
jury poll following the rendering of a partial verdict would be 
beyond attack through the use of juror testimony, at least not 
until the time that a complete verdict is rendered or a partial 
mistrial declared.  Since taking a jury poll at that time would 
thus become a futile gesture, juries would not be polled (and the 
partial verdict would not be validated) until it became certain 
that they would deliberate no longer.  Congress could not have 
intended Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) to so fully diminish the beneficial 
effects of partial verdicts.  See Hockridge, 573 F.2d at 759. 
     We conclude that Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) embodies a decision that 
the costs of making an inquiry into possible juror misbehavior in 
circumstances such as these outweigh the potential benefits.  
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction with respect to Counts I, 
II, VI, VII, and XII will be affirmed. 
                                B. 
     Stansfield asks us to reverse his conviction on Count XI, the 
tampering with a witness count, and remand with directions to enter 
a judgment of acquittal on that count on the grounds that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.  Specifically, 
he argues that the evidence was deficient in two respects:  it did 
not prove that he intended to hinder Dwight Hoffman's futurecommunication 
with law enforcement officials, and it did not prove 
that he intended to prevent Hoffman's communications with a federallaw 
enforcement officer.  Alternatively, he contends that the jury 
was not properly instructed either on the "attempt to kill" element 
of the statute pursuant to which he was convicted or on the 
"federal officer" element.  Accordingly, he argues, his conviction 
must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial on Count 
XI.  We address each contention in turn. 
                                1. 
     Count XI of the indictment charged that, on or about October 
7, 1993, Stansfield "did assault and attempt to kill one Dwight E. 
Hoffman with the intent to prevent Hoffman's communication of 
information relating to STANSFIELD'S commission of federal offenses 
. . . to a law enforcement officer" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(a)(1)(C).  App. at 35.  Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) 
provides, in pertinent part:  "Whoever kills or attempts to kill 
another person, with intent to prevent the communication by any 
person to a law enforcement officer . . . of information relating 
to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense" 
shall be imprisoned for up to twenty years. 
     The term "law enforcement officer" is defined as "an officer 
or employee of the Federal Government, or a person authorized to 
act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the 
Federal Government as an adviser or consultant authorized under law 
to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, 
or prosecution of an offense."  Id. § 1515(a)(4).  However, the 
government need not prove that Stansfield knew or intended "that 
the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the 
Federal Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf 
of the Federal Government."  Id. § 1512(f). 
     As we stated in United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d 
Cir.) (quoting United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 
1992)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 341 (1994), we 
                    "must sustain the verdict of a jury if there 
                    is substantial evidence, viewed in the light 
                    most favorable to the Government, to uphold 
                    the jury's decision.  In determining whether 
                    evidence is sufficient, we will not weigh 
                    evidence or determine the credibility of 
                    witnesses.  Appellate reversal on the grounds 
                    of insufficient evidence should be confined to 
                    cases where the failure of the prosecution is 
                    clear.  The evidence need not be inconsistent 
                    with every conclusion save that of guilt, so 
                    long as it establishes a case from which a 
                    jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
                    reasonable doubt." 
                     
                                          a. 
     The evidence proved that Stansfield held a shotgun at Dwight 
Hoffman's throat and asked him a number of questions, including why 
Hoffman had told law enforcement officials about the fire at 
Stansfield's house.  This evidence is sufficient for a jury to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Stansfield intended to 
prevent Hoffman's future communications with law enforcement 
officials, not merely that he intended to retaliate against Hoffman 
for past communications with law enforcement officials.  The jury 
in its opinion could reasonably conclude that inherent in the 
action of pointing a loaded firearm at another's throat and asking, 
in effect, "Why did you do it?" is the implicit message, "Don't 
ever do it again."  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
prove that Stansfield intended to foreclose future communications 
by Hoffman with law enforcement officials. 
                                b. 
     We also find the evidence sufficed to satisfy the "federal 
officer" element of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(C) and 1515(a)(4).  The 
parties dispute what the government has to prove in order to 
satisfy this requirement.  Stansfield urges that the government 
must prove "an intent to prevent the communication of information 
to some particular law enforcement officer, or at least to any 
agent involved in a particular, actual federal investigation," as 
long as that officer is federal.  Appellant's Brief at 16.  The 
government argues that it need only prove that the offense about 
which the defendant wishes to prevent communications is actually a 
federal offense. 
     The case law from our sister circuits does not support 
Stansfield's view.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1449 (1996) wrote:  "There need not 
be an ongoing investigation or even any intent to investigate.  
Rather, the killing of an individual with the intent to frustrate 
the individual's possible cooperation with federal authorities is 
implicated by the statute" (emphasis added).  The Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 
645 (7th Cir. 1994), held that what is essential is that "the 
defendant believed that a person might furnish information to 
federal officials and that he killed or attempted to kill that 
person in order to prevent such disclosure" (second emphasis 
added).  Accord United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 783 (5th 
Cir. 1991) ("[T]he statute focuses on the defendant's intent:  
whether she thought she might be preventing [the witness'] future 
communication of information.") (emphasis added); United States v. 
Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
932, 109 S.Ct. 324 (1988) ("[I]t is only necessary for a defendant 
to have believed that a witness might give information to federal 
officials, and to have prevented this communication, to violate 18 
U.S.C. § 1510."). 
     This is not to say that the position of the government is 
without problems.  Were we to require only that the government 
prove that the underlying offense is federal and that the defendant 
intended to prevent the witness from communicating with law 
enforcement officials in general, without also proving the 
defendant's knowledge of or belief in the possibility that the 
witness would communicate with federal authorities, we would 
essentially vitiate an important facet of the intent requirement of 
the statute. 
     Accordingly, we hold that, in order to obtain a conviction 
pursuant to § 1512(a)(1)(C), the government must prove:  (1) the 
defendant killed or attempted to kill a person; (2) the defendant 
was motivated by a desire to prevent the communication between any 
person and law enforcement authorities concerning the commission or 
possible commission of an offense; (3) that offense was actually a 
federal offense; and (4) the defendant believed that the person in 
(2) above might communicate with the federal authorities.  This 
last element may be inferred by the jury from the fact that the 
offense was federal in nature, plus additional appropriate 
evidence.  For example, it is sufficient (but not necessary) that 
the government prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the 
federal nature of the offense in order for the jury to infer the 
last element. 
 
     This framework is an appropriate reconciliation between the 
constraint that the government must prove the defendant's specific 
intent to hinder a federal investigation and the fact that, by 
virtue of § 1512(f), it need not prove that the defendant knew the 
federal status of any particular law enforcement officer involved 
in an investigation.  Cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 
1054 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014, 112 S.Ct. 660 (1991); 
United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1984). 
     In this matter, the underlying offense clearly was a federal 
offense.  The evidence reflected that Hoffman had already 
cooperated several times with state authorities and with Erie.  
Stansfield had knowledge of Hoffman's past cooperation and was 
aware that some investigation, though not necessarily a federal 
one, was underway.  Moreover, though it is unclear whether 
Stansfield was aware of it, the evidence also showed that federal 
authorities had begun an investigation approximately one month 
prior to the conduct in question.  Given that Stansfield violated 
several federal laws and based on the actions he took thereafter, 
a jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
attack was motivated, at least in part, by Stansfield's belief that 
Hoffman might cooperate with federal authorities.  See Gonzalez, 
922 F.2d at 1054.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). 
                                2. 
                                a. 
     Although Stansfield was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(a)(1)(C), the district court, without objection from counsel, 
instructed the jury on a different but related offense, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(b)(3).  After reading count XI of the indictment verbatim, 
the district court instructed the jury:  "Whoever knowingly uses 
intimidation or physical force, with intent to hinder, delay, or 
prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of 
information relating to the commission or possible commission of a 
federal offense shall be guilty of a crime."  App. at 104 (emphasis 
added).  This reflects the language of § 1512(b)(3), which 
provides, in relevant part:  "Whoever knowingly uses intimidation 
or physical force [or] threatens . . . another person, or attempts 
to do so, . . . with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the 
communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United 
States of information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense" is guilty of a crime.  The 
district court proceeded to set forth and explain the elements of 
a violation of § 1512(b)(3), not § 1512(a)(1)(C). 
     Because there was no objection to the charge, Fed. R. Crim. P.52(b) 
is implicated.  The Rule provides:  "Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court."  The concept of "plain 
error" comprises four elements:  (1) there must be an error, seeUnited 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777- 
78 (1993); (2) the error must be "plain," meaning "clear" or 
"obvious," id.; (3) the plain error must be one "affecting 
substantial rights," i.e., "it must have been prejudicial:  It must 
have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings," id.; 
and (4) because "Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory," the 
court should correct plain error affecting substantial rights only 
where the error (a) "causes the conviction or sentencing of an 
actually innocent defendant," or (b) "`seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"  
Id. at 735-36, 113 S.Ct. at 1778-79 (quoting United States v. 
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392 (1936)) (alteration 
added). 
     For our purposes the difference between § 1512(a)(1)(C) and § 
1512(b)(3) is that the former includes an "attempt to kill" element 
while the latter includes only a "uses intimidation or physical 
force" element.  The question we face, then, is whether the 
omission of the "attempt to kill" element constituted plain error 
and requires us to reverse Stansfield's conviction on Count XI.  We 
hold it does. 
     This Court has declined to adopt a per se rule that the 
omission of an essential element of an offense from jury 
instructions constitutes plain error.  See United States v. Xavier, 
2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, we have also stated 
that such an omission "`ordinarily constitutes plain error.'"  Id.(quoting 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Brown, 685 F.2d 834, 839 
(3d Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in Xavier).  See also United States v. 
Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1176 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Small, 472 F.2d 818, 819 (3d Cir. 1972).  This "general rule . . . 
is consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction that due process 
requires `proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged.'"  
Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1287 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 
90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970)) (alteration added). 
     The omission of an essential element of an offense from the 
jury instructions usually will be obvious error, and therefore 
ordinarily satisfies the first and second requirements of Olano, 
507 U.S. at 733-34, 113 S.Ct. at 1777.  We have little trouble in 
concluding that the omission of the attempt to kill element in this 
case satisfies those first two requirements.  See generally Retos, 
25 F.3d at 1229-30.  We therefore turn to the cases that have 
discussed the third and fourth steps of Olano. 
     In Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286, the defendant was convicted of 
aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.  The jury was never instructed that knowledge of the status 
of the primary wrongdoer (defendant's brother) as a felon was an 
essential element of the crime.  Concluding that the omission 
constituted plain error, the court wrote that "there can be no 
question that the failure to instruct had an impact on the jury's 
deliberations, because the jury could not have been expected to 
make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt as to [defendant's] 
knowledge of his brother's status as a felon in the absence of an 
instruction to do so."  Id. at 1287.  Thus, the third Olano step 
was satisfied.  The consequent effect on defendant's due process 
rights were such that the error "seriously affected the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings," which 
satisfied Olano's fourth and final step.  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
     Similarly, in Retos, 25 F.3d at 1229-30, the district court 
failed to instruct the jury that, to convict the defendant for 
currency structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5324(3), 
it was required to find that he actually knew that such structuring 
was unlawful, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, ___, 114 S.Ct. 655, 663 (1994).  
With respect to the third Olano step, we wrote that, because "the 
evidence presented by the government on [the defendant's] 
structuring count, while sufficient, was not conclusive . . . we 
cannot be certain that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Retos knew his actions were unlawful, absent a specific 
instruction from the district court judge."  Id. at 1232.  We then 
concluded that, inasmuch as the defendant suffered "severe 
prejudice," which is "a hallmark of manifest injustice," the 
omission in the jury charge "`seriously affect[ed] the fairness'" 
of the trial and satisfied the fourth Olano step.  Id. at 1232 
(quoting Olano, 507 U.S at 736, 113 S.Ct. at 1779) (alteration in 
Retos). 
     By contrast, in Anderson, 859 F.2d at 1176, the district court 
had failed to instruct the jury that to find the defendant guilty 
of a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE"), it was required to 
unanimously agree that he committed three violations of the federal 
drug laws.  However, the jury convicted the defendant of three 
counts of heroin distribution and one count of conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, as well as 
the CCE count.  See id..  Thus, the jury necessarily made the 
determination of guilt that was a predicate to conviction on the 
CCE count even though it was not properly instructed.  We refused 
to find plain error because it was not possible that the jury did 
not find the omitted element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See id. 
     Such is not the case here.  As in Xavier and Retos, the 
omission of the "attempt to kill" instruction satisfies both the 
third and fourth steps of the Olano analysis and constitutes plain 
error.  As for the third step, while there was overwhelming 
evidence that Stansfield "use[d] intimidation or physical force" 
against Dwight Hoffman, the evidence that he attempted to kill 
Hoffman, while perhaps sufficient to support a conviction by a 
properly instructed jury, was more sketchy and circumstantial in 
nature.  It is quite likely that the outcome on Count XI would have 
been different given a proper charge.  Even if we conclude that the 
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Stansfield violated 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), that is a less serious offense, with a 
statutory maximum sentence of ten years, as opposed to the twenty 
year maximum provided for by § 1512(a)(1)(C).  We conclude that the 
error was not harmless. 
     We also conclude that the fourth Olano step, that the error 
"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings," is satisfied by the failure to instruct 
a jury that in order to convict a defendant of attempting to kill 
another to achieve a desired result, the jury must find he actually 
attempted to kill that person.  Instructing a jury essentially that 
this element may be satisfied by showing the defendant "merely" 
intimidated or used physical force, and then adjudging him guilty 
of the more serious crime, is the type of error that would impugn 
the judicial system and bring it into disrepute. 
     The government contends that the error was harmless and did 
not "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings."  It argues that Stansfield never disputed 
he attempted to kill Dwight Hoffman and the evidence was 
overwhelming that he did.  This argument is not persuasive.  First, 
the evidence was far from overwhelming or conclusive that 
Stansfield attempted to kill Hoffman.  Second, the government cites 
only Stansfield's closing argument, in which his attorney conceded 
that Stansfield "may well have intended to kill" the Hoffmans, 
Supp. App. at 29, for the proposition that he did not dispute that 
element of the offense.  Even if this language were truly a 
stipulation, which it is not, it concedes only that Stansfield 
intended to kill Dwight Hoffman, not that he attempted to kill 
Dwight Hoffman.  Moreover, arguments of counsel are not evidence 
but are merely comments on evidence.  Stansfield's closing argument 
did not relieve the government of its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Stansfield attempted to kill Dwight Hoffman. 
     We conclude that the omission of the "intent to kill" element 
from the instructions given the jury constituted plain error.  
Accordingly, Stansfield's conviction on Count XI for violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) must be reversed and remanded for a new 
trial. 
                                b. 
     Stansfield also argues that the district court erred by 
failing to instruct the jury that the "law enforcement officer" 
referred to in § 1512 be an existing federal officer actually 
investigating the federal offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
1515(a)(4).  Stansfield did not contemporaneously object to the 
instructions.  The instruction given the jury was not in accord 
with what we have held regarding this element of the offense.  Seesupra at 
22. 
     On remand, the jury should be instructed that in order to find 
Stansfield guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), it 
must find in addition to the other elements of the offense both 
that he was motivated by a belief that the victim might communicate 
with federal authorities concerning the commission or possible 
commission of an offense, and that the offense in question is in 
fact a federal offense.  Given appropriate evidence, if the jury 
finds the latter fact to exist, it may find the former to exist as 
well. 
                               III. 
     The judgment of conviction entered September 15, 1995, is 
affirmed as to Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, and XII.  The judgment 
of conviction on Count XI is reversed.  The judgment of sentencing 
on all counts is vacated.  The case is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
     I agree with the majority's analysis and conclusions in all 
respects but one.  As to Count XI of the indictment, which charged 
Stansfield with witness tampering, I cannot agree with the 
majority's conclusion that "the evidence was sufficient to support 
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C)."  Maj. Op. at 26.  In 
my view, this result rests upon an erroneous application of 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), one which is not supported by either the 
case law on which the majority relies or the language of the 
statute itself.  And our disagreement is significant not only 
because of the effect the majority's application will have on the 
government's burden of proof in future cases brought under this 
statute, but because if the majority is correct Stansfield will in 
all likelihood be retried on this twenty-year count, whereas if my 
understanding is correct the appropriate disposition is a judgment 
of acquittal due to the government's failure to introduce evidence 
to sustain a conviction on this count. 
     The majority purportedly rejects the government's argument 
that it "need only prove that the offense about which the defendant 
wishes to prevent communications is actually a federal offense."  
Maj. Op. at 20 (emphasis added).  Here, the majority and I are in 
agreement, for the government's argument essentially asks that it 
be required to prove nothing.  Instead, the majority offers a four- 
part construction of the statute, which requires the government to 
prove, inter alia, that the defendant believed that the victim 
might communicate with federal authorities.  Id. at 22.  
Unfortunately, the majority fails to apply its own construction of 
the statute, finding Stansfield's conviction supportable based 
solely on the federal nature of his offense and evidence showing 
that a file had been opened by federal authorities.  Stansfield's 
intent is irrelevant under the majority's analysis.  Contending 
that Stansfield's intent "may be inferred," id., from the mere fact 
that the underlying offense happened to be a federal offense, even 
though the government offered absolutely no evidence to show that 
Stansfield had any knowledge, awareness or belief that he had 
committed a federal offense or was the subject of a federal 
investigation, the majority essentially eviscerates the intent 
element of the statute.  I cannot agree with this analysis.  
Instead, I believe the government must demonstrate, through direct 
or circumstantial evidence -- but beyond a reasonable doubt -- that 
Stansfield believed that the underlying offense was federal or was 
being investigated by federal authorities with whom the victim of 
the threats might communicate.  It is this important element -- 
some evidence of the defendant's awareness of the federal nature of 
his crime, which in turn could form the basis for his intent to 
prevent a communication about it to a federal official -- that is 
missing from both the majority's analysis and the government's 
proof in this case.  And while the majority concedes that proof of 
either of these things would be sufficient to establish a 
defendant's intent, it offers no explanation as to how else a 
defendant's intent could possibly be established. 
     Moreover, the majority's reliance on case law from other 
circuits to support its conclusion is misguided.  The question 
presented in Romero, Edwards, and Leisure was whether § 1512 
required the presence of an ongoing federal investigation to 
support a conviction for witness tampering under the statute.  SeeUnited 
States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1449 (1996); United States v Edwards, 36 
F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 
(8th Cir. 1988).  While it is true that these cases rejected the 
requirement of an ongoing investigation, they do not support the 
majority's conclusion here that a defendant's intent can be 
inferred, without more, by the mere fact that the defendant 
committed a federal crime.  On the contrary, in each of these cases 
the defendant had knowledge of the federal nature of the crime and 
of the consequent potential of a federal investigation.  In 
Romero, for example, the court noted that "members of [the 
defendant's] organization had become suspicious that [the witness] 
was cooperating with federal authorities."  Romero, 54 F.3d at 59.  
And in Edwards, the government presented testimony which indicated 
that the defendants killed the victim "because they feared he was 
informing the DEA about their operations."  Edwards, 36 F.3d at 645 
(emphasis added).  Thus, although the government need not prove the 
presence of an ongoing federal investigation, it must at least 
prove "that the defendant believed that a person might furnish 
information to federal officials and that he killed or attempted to 
kill that person in order to prevent such disclosure."  Id.(emphasis 
added) (citing Leisure, 844 F.2d at 1364). 
     Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) provides:  "Whoever kills or 
attempts to kill another person with intent to prevent the 
communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of 
the United States of information relating to the commission or 
possible commission of a Federal offense" shall be imprisoned for 
up to twenty years.  As the majority notes, "law enforcement 
officer" is defined as "an officer or employee of the Federal 
government, or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the 
Federal government . . . ."  18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4)(A).  Thus, at 
a minimum, the government must prove that the defendant believed 
that there was a possibility of a federal investigation. 
     The majority is overly generous to the government, however, in 
stating that Stansfield "was aware that some investigation, though 
not necessarily a federal one, was under way," and concluding that 
this is enough to support his conviction.  Maj. Op. at 25-26.  In 
fact, the government did not introduce any evidence to suggest that 
Stansfield could have known of the possibility of a federalinvestigation.  
The evidence only established that Stansfield knew 
that the Pennsylvania State Police and Erie Insurance Company were 
interviewing potential witnesses and pursuing an investigation, and 
that Hoffman had been interviewed by both.  It is obvious from the 
evidence that he was angry that Hoffman might be cooperating with 
a state official (who happened to be the only law enforcement 
officer conducting any investigation at that time), not a federal 
official.  We don't know, and the government has not shown, that he 
even had any reason to believe that his offenses were federal in 
nature, or that the victims might communicate with federal 
authorities.  In light of the total lack of evidence in this 
respect, I am perplexed by the majority's conclusion that a jury 
could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Stansfield 
believed that Hoffman might cooperate with federal authorities.  
There is simply no basis in the record to justify this conclusion. 
     Moreover, while the majority states that "the evidence also 
showed that federal authorities had begun an investigation 
approximately one month prior to the conduct in question[,]" id. at 
26, in fact, the evidence showed that Postal Inspectors had merely 
opened a file on the case and had done nothing more.  But unless he 
had a mole inside the Postal Inspection Service or was clairvoyant, 
Stansfield surely was not aware that a file had been opened.  And 
since nothing else of a federal investigative nature had occurred, 
Stansfield could not have known that a federal investigation (if 
that's what opening a file is) was in the works. 
     On the record before us, therefore, there is simply no way to 
conclude that Stansfield either believed that a federal 
investigation was underway or could possibly have been aware of the 
potential for a federal investigation.  While it is easy for those 
of us versed in the federal law to conclude, as the majority does, 
that "the underlying offense clearly was a federal offense[,]" id.at 25, 
Stansfield is neither a lawyer nor a judge, and the 
government has yet to demonstrate, even remotely, that Stansfield 
had reason to believe that the underlying offense was federal in 
nature, or had reason to believe that Hoffman might have talked to 
"an officer or employee of the federal government" (which he had 
not), or might do so in the future.  He could not possibly have 
intended to frustrate a communication he had no reason to believe 
might occur, to a person he had no reason to believe existed. 
     Despite the majority's protestations to the contrary, the 
effect of the majority's construction and application of this 
important statute is not only to diminish, but as a practical 
matter to remove, the government's burden of proof.  Unlike the 
cases on which the majority relies, here the government did not 
prove that Stansfield believed or was aware of the possibility or 
existence of a federal investigation, yet the majority finds that 
lack of proof irrelevant because, once again, it can be "inferred" 
from the fact that Stansfield's underlying offense just happened to 
be a federal offense.  To relieve the government of its burden of 
proving an important element of a criminal offense is a serious 
step, and I believe the majority's approach here is seriously out 
of step with both the case law and the statute. 
     I would enter a judgment of acquittal on Count XI.  I concur 
in the remainder of the majority opinion. 
